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We study the development of wealth concentration in Sweden over 130 years, from the begin-
ning of industrialization until present day. Our series are based on a wide array of new evi-
dence from estate- and wealth tax data, estimates of foreign and domestic family firm-wealth 
and of pension and social security wealth. We find that the Swedish wealth concentration was 
at a historically high level in the agrarian state and that it did not change much during early in-
dustrialization. From World War I up until about 1950, the richest percentile lost ground to the 
rest of the top wealth decile where relatively income rich households accumulated new wealth. 
In the postwar period, the entire top decile lost out relative to the rest of the population. 
Around 1980, wealth compression stopped and inequality increased. We introduce new ways 
of approximating the effects of international flows and find that the recent increase in Swedish 
wealth inequality is likely to be larger than what official estimates suggest. 
 
 
Keywords: Wealth concentration, Wealth distribution, Inequality, Income distribution, Swe-
den, Welfare state, Pension wealth, Augmented wealth 
JEL codes: D14, D31, N33, N34 
 
                                                 
∗ We would like to thank Bo Bergman, Gunnar Blomberg, Annika Sundén, two anonymous referees and the 
editor as well as participants at the European Historical Economics Society Conference in Lund, 2007 for sug-
gestions and comments. A special thanks to Henry Ohlsson who has been a valuable contributor to parts of this 
project. 
♣ SITE, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Ph: +46-8-7369682, E-mail: 
jesper.roine@hhs.se  
g IFN, P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden, Ph: +46-8-6654500, E-mail: daniel.waldenstrom@ifn.se   2
1  Introduction 
Theories about the dynamics of wealth distribution are typically concerned with the long run, 
as most famously exemplified by Kuznets’ hypothesis about the rise and fall of inequality 
over development. However, comparable data covering sufficiently long periods to evaluate 
such theories are scarce.
1 The main contribution of this paper is to provide new series of 
wealth concentration in Sweden for the years 1873–2005, thus covering a period from the 
beginning of industrialization to present day. By constructing alternative series using both 




Besides allowing us to study changes in inequality over the transition from an agrarian to an 
industrial economy, there are other reasons for why the case of Sweden is particularly inter-
esting. First, over the 20th century Sweden developed the world’s most extensive welfare 
state with a strong egalitarian emphasis. Putting wealth equalization in historical perspective 
is crucial for understanding the achievements of the Swedish welfare state but also to get fur-
ther insights to the society in which it gained popular support. Second, comparing wealth con-
centration over time in Sweden with the patterns for France (Piketty, Postel-Vinay and Rosen-
thal, 2006), Switzerland (Dell, Piketty and Saez 2007), and the United States (Kopczuk and 
Saez, 2004) is interesting as Sweden was not affected by the main economic and geopolitical 




Several important findings come out of our analysis. Our main series suggest that the period 
1873–2005 can be divided into three broad phases based on how wealth concentration has 
                                                 
1 Recent studies on long run wealth concentration are Piketty, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal, 2006 (France); Dell, 
Piketty and Saez, 2007 (Switzerland); and Kopczuk and Saez, 2004 (US). Out of these it is only the data for 
France that covers the whole industrialization. Lindert (2000) provides an overview of previous work on histori-
cal wealth statistics.   
2 Spanning 130 years our series are the longest available estimates of the evolution of wealth distribution in Swe-
den to date. Spånt (1979, 1987) cover the years 1920-1983. Our main series are, due to availability of data, lim-
ited to shares of total wealth held by the top decile of the distribution (and fractiles within this group). This is, 
however, not very restrictive in terms of capturing most of the wealth since concentration has been very high for 
most of the period. Furthermore, the share held by the rest of the population is of course captured as a residual.  
3 Sweden did not participate in any of the World Wars and was not affected much by the great depression (but 
did experience a different stock-market crash in 1932 with important consequences for top wealth holders). Swit-
zerland, of course, did not participate in the World Wars either but on the other hand Sweden and Switzerland 
differ on many other accounts, in particular with respect to the size of government     3
evolved. First, though data are scarce for the period before World War I, our estimates sug-
gest that wealth was concentrated in the agrarian economy but also that it did not change 
much during the initial phase of industrialization. The slight increase that we find is limited 
the top one percent gaining at the expense of the other groups, hence, giving only limited sup-
port to the idea that inequality increases in the early stages of industrialization. Second, from 
the 1910s up to the early 1980s, wealth became significantly less concentrated. In the begin-
ning of this period a number of major institutional changes in society took place. The fran-
chise was extended, first to all men in 1907 and then universally in 1921, progressive taxation 
was introduced, first for income, in 1903, and then extended to include wealth in 1911. How-
ever, none of these changes seem directly related to the initial phase of wealth compression, 
which was characterized by wealth being more evenly spread within the top decile as the top 
percentile lost out to the following nine. Instead it looks as if the development before 1950 
was mainly driven by accumulation among groups with relatively high incomes but little pre-
vious wealth. Thanks to the way in which income and wealth taxes were reported we can cal-
culate the wealth share for different income groups and we find that the wealth shares of high 
income earners - but not for the very top – increase in the first half of the twentieth century. 
After 1950 the wealth compression looks different, with sharp increases in “popular wealth” 
(mainly owner-occupied housing) among the broader population (the P0–90 group). Between 
1950 and 1980, the entire top decile loses ground to the rest of the population. Overall, this 
development of gradual leveling, first based on accumulation among relatively income rich 
groups and then moving down the distribution, is consistent with a Kuznets-type process.  
 
While we do not have sufficient data to explicitly test the relative importance of changes in, 
for example, income distribution, savings behavior and real income growth, we can study 
distributional changes and changes in wealth composition to see which explanations seem 
most likely.
4 Our conclusion is that this process was most likely driven mainly by economic 
growth which gradually allowed more and more individuals to start to accumulate wealth, but 
the leveling was also affected by the income distribution becoming more equal as well as by 
progressive taxation and various government programs (especially generously subsidized 
                                                 
4 See, e.g. Champernowne and Cowell (1998) and Davies and Shorrocks (2000) for overviews on theories of 
wealth distribution. See also Berg (1988) which contains an explicit model of savings and wealth dynamics for 
Sweden 1954-1986.   4
loans for owner occupied housing).
5 Furthermore, our results for the period 1910-1980 also 
suggests that what happened in Sweden was different, from, for example, the French experi-
ence where the decline was mainly driven by exogenous shocks as shown by Piketty et al. 
(2006).  
 
Finally, in the early 1980s the long period of wealth leveling came to a halt. According to 
official wealth tax-based estimates inequality has, however, remained at historically low lev-
els with only slight increases in the past decades. At the same time there are reasons to believe 
that these statistics underestimate the recent increases in wealth concentration. In the period 
after 1985 capital controls were removed and stock market-listed financial assets (known to 
be concentrated in ownership) surged in value, increasing by over 20 percent per year in real 
terms. There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence of Swedes having moved themselves or their 
wealth abroad to avoid high wealth and inheritance taxes. We use the official national statis-
tics over the balance of payments and the financial accounts to estimate the size of “unex-
plained” financial savings (or “capital flight”) of households and use these estimates to get a 
sense of their possible impact on wealth inequality. Naturally, the great uncertainty associated 
with these numbers forces us to present a collection of estimates where we use alternative 
sources and different assumptions about the size and the distribution of foreign wealth, as 
well as rates of return on accumulated foreign holdings. Our basic finding is that official sta-
tistics are likely to underestimate the recent increase in wealth concentration, possibly quite 
substantially, and that we may have entered a new phase of increased wealth concentration 
where the measurement of this becomes more difficult as capital in more internationalized.
6  
2  Measurement issues and data 
2.1  Measurement issues 
Our main concept of wealth is net worth, or net marketable wealth, which is defined as the 
sum of market-valued real and financial assets less debts. This is the standard measure of per-
sonal wealth in wealth inequality research and it is also the by far most common measure in 
                                                 
5 As we will discuss further below the major changes in wealth shares for various groups in the distribution do 
not seem to correspond to changes in their income shares. This suggests that the gains in wealth shares must 
come from changed savings behavior or changes in returns (higher compared to the average) or some kind of 
policy driven advantage, unless there was an increase in income mobility.   
6 Here one can also note that our analysis point to a number of more conceptual problems with measuring wealth 
(or income) inequality of a country when residency and even citizenship may be “internationalized”.   5
historical tax-based sources of wealth inequality for most countries.
7 In the case of Sweden, 
net worth is what has been specified in the taxation of estates and of wealth.
8 One item not 
included in net worth is pension wealth. Pension rights are relatively important in the Swedish 
case which influences both international comparisons and historical analyses as these systems 
have grown from non-existence to being important parts of personal wealth. For this reason 
we also present new estimates of the recent trends in Swedish augmented wealth concentra-
tion, i.e., top wealth shares when both net worth and contributions into pension schemes and 
future social security payments are included.  
 
Measuring net worth is sensitive to the valuation of assets. For example, in the early years 
taxation values are observed and these may deviate from market values. But if this discrep-
ancy is similar across the distribution – and historically this was arguably the case – the bias-
ing effect of valuation on wealth shares should be small. In order to get a sense of the effect 
of valuation on our results, however, we make use of several alternative estimates of aggre-
gate wealth (based on either tax or market values as well as including items which have not 
been taxable) and also different assumptions about the distribution of the difference between 
these alternative reference totals and our baseline. This exercise indicates that there are some 
differences in the levels of wealth shares over the period, but the trends in wealth concentra-
tion remain unchanged. Overall, we believe that the comparability of our estimated shares is 
good over time, while the comparability of the absolute values over time could be more prob-
lematic. 
 
The concept of wealth owner used in the study varies depending on what data source is used. 
When we use wealth tax-based data we refer to “households”. For the most part, this means 
tax households where married couples count as one, as do children 18 years or older living at 
home. For the years after 1975, however, households are defined as cost households, the ma-
jor difference being that adult children living at home are included in parents’ household. The 
                                                 
7 For an overview of international wealth concentration data, see Ohlsson et al. (2006). 
8 Naturally, there is a discrepancy between the conceptual and practical contents of net worth. Although they 
include the same items there are potentially vast differences in how they have been valued. Spånt (1979) dis-
cusses how the differences between market values and tax-assessed values have influenced the composition of 
wealth. Historically, however, the distributional differences turn out to be relatively small in the aggregate for 
most items. In the robustness section of the paper we also address the impact of this on our estimated wealth 
shares.   6
estate tax data are individual-based.
9 Top shares estimated at the individual level may be dif-
ferent from top shares estimated at the household level. The size and direction this difference 
depends on the extent to which wealth is distributed among spouses within families. In a for-
mal discussion of this issue, Atkinson (2007) shows that for a given top wealth share in the 
household distribution, the share would be about 20 percent higher in the individual distribu-
tion if all the wealthy are unmarried or have spouses with no wealth and about 20 percent 
lower if all the rich are married to each other and their wealth distributed equally between 
spouses. As our series below will show, the recorded shifts in Swedish top wealth shares in 
both the household and individual distributions during the period we study are large enough 
for them not to be sensitive to the issues discussed by Atkinson.
10 
 
Our main measure of wealth concentration is the wealth share held by various fractions of the 
population, i.e., the share of total wealth held by the wealthiest five percent or the wealthiest 
one percent of the population. As is typically the case when using historical data we face a 
problem with measuring the reference total of net personal wealth of the whole population. 
The wealth tax data typically only cover the households in the top five percentiles that have 
paid wealth tax and we must therefore limit our observations to years when attempts to meas-
ure the corresponding total for the whole population have been made. This has been done in 
some of the past Censuses and in a few special public investigations but there are many years 
for which we have distributional information for the top but no reliable reference total.
11 
2.2  Data 
Our main series on the Swedish wealth concentration are based on information about personal 
wealth statements in estate tax returns (various years during 1873–2003) and wealth tax re-
turns, complemented by bank and public registry statements about people’s wealth (various 
years during 1911–2006).
12 Both wealth tax and estate tax data are problematic in several 
ways (as we discuss below), but they are the only viable alternatives for studying wealth con-
                                                 
9 In some cases the estate reports, however, include joint property if there is a surviving spouse and the property 
of a deceased spouse that has not previously been transferred to heirs. 
10 See also, Kopczuk and Saez (2004) who discuss possible differences between individual based and household 
based series concluding that the magnitude is not likely to be such that it would explain the large changes in 
wealth distribution in the US over the century.   
11 For example, Flodström (1914) presents data on the very top for the year 1912 and for all years since 1945 
Statistics Sweden published annual reports on wealth tax returns for the top, but with no indications about reli-
able reference totals for net personal wealth.  
12 There are some other sources of wealth data, in particular household surveys, which we do not use. The reason 
is mainly that they contain too few observations to allow a comprehensive analysis of the top of the distribution.    7
centration over longer time periods. Comparing the trends of the series based on wealth tax 
and estate tax data, respectively, is also interesting as it arguably gives a richer picture of the 
development. In addition to these standard sources, our study also introduces the use of esti-
mated foreign wealth holdings of households drawing on statistical estimates in the balance of 
payments and the financial accounts from the 1970s. As a consequence of Sweden’s high 
wealth taxes and liberalized capital account (after 1989) these foreign holdings have been 
claimed to be substantial. Moreover, we use journalistic estimates of wealth of super rich 
Swedes in order to assess the possible influence of very large closely held family firms (that 
do not show up on tax returns) on the standard measures of inequality. Finally, we present 
estimates of the level and trend of augmented wealth concentration. 
2.2.1  Estate data 
Estate data is a common source for deriving measures of wealth distribution. The time of 
death is often the only time when an individual’s total assets and debts are revealed for the 
purpose of estate division and estate or inheritance taxation. Assuming that those who die in 
any given year constitute a random sample of the living population of the same sex and age, 
one can convert the distribution of wealth among those who died into the distribution for the 
living using a mortality multiplier, which weights the individual estates in different age 




Our Swedish estate data are in the form of grouped distributions for the diseased. They draw 
on estate tax reports, beginning in 1873-77, which are the earliest years for which tabulated 
estate distributions are available, and continuing with observations for the periods 1906-08, 
1942-43, 1954/55, 1967, and 2002-03, covering a total of 130 years.
14 Only for the year 1908 
we have the distribution of estates adjusted with mortality multipliers, i.e., when each estate is 
multiplied by the inverse age-based mortality rate based on the age of the diseased individ-
ual.
15 This allows us to calculate wealth shares for the living population on top of that of the 
disiead population. Whether these two distributions differ much in terms of level or trends is 
an open question. Judging from the behavior of our estate series in comparison to our wealth 
                                                 
13 For a detailed discussion of mortality multipliers, see Atkinson and Harrison (1978, ch. 3). 
14 The sources of the estate data are the Ministry of Finance (1879, 1910) and SOU (1946, 1957, 1969, 2004). 
15 For details of the application of the estate multiplier method on the 1908 data, see Ministry of Finance (1910, 
pp. 14-34).   8
tax-based series for periods when they overlap the effect seems to be marginal, at least in 
terms of representing the long-run inequality trends.
16  
 
Another issue with analyzing estate data is that for single years large individual estates may 
have a disproportionate impact on estimated wealth shares, especially in the top. As we are 
able to use consecutive years the risk of having influential outliers becomes smaller.
17  
2.2.2  Wealth tax data  
Compared to estimating the wealth distribution based on estate data, wealth tax data is a more 
direct way to measure what we really wish to estimate: the distribution of wealth in the (liv-
ing) population. Wealth tax returns have also been the main source for studies of Swedish 
wealth inequality due to its relative availability. However, there are important problems asso-
ciated with this data source which severely impedes the study of wealth concentration. First, 
only a minority of the population has paid wealth taxes and the construction of reference 
wealth totals for the whole population is therefore problematic.
18 Second, consumer durables 
are quite imperfectly covered in the wealth tax returns, which could imply a significant un-
derestimation of “popular wealth”.
19 Third, pension wealth is not included in our analysis 
mainly because it is mostly not controlled directly by the households but rather a claim of 
future cash flows (net of tax). This is perhaps our most problematic coverage issue since ten-
tative analyses suggest that pension wealth could reduce the concentration of wealth most 
substantially. Fourth, the wedge between tax-assessed and market-based values of personal 
assets has varied over time. Prior to the 1980s market values in the heavily regulated Swedish 
                                                 
16 According to data from France in Piketty et al. (2006) the differences seem to be marginal. Atkinson (2008), 
however, point to British wealth studies using estates where the differences have been sizeable.  
17 The sources of the estate data are the Ministry of Finance (1879, 1910) and SOU (1946, 1957, 1969, 2004). 
Only for the year 1908 is there data based on applying the estate multiplier method to the estate data, see the 
Ministry of Finance (1910: 14-34). For the other years we can only calculate top wealth shares at death. Estate 
taxes were being levied already in the eighteenth century but from these early years there is no compiled distri-
butional evidence available on the national level (see Ohlsson, 2006). 
18 Survey data are better since the survey can be designed so as to include (or exclude) items regardless of the tax 
law and the sample can be drawn so as to represent the whole distribution, but at the same time this particular 
feature is a major problem when it comes to studying wealth concentration. Wealth is typically very concentrated 
and, therefore, a randomized sample of the whole population must be very large to cover sufficiently many in the 
very top to get a reliable picture. 
19 The absence of consumer durables (furniture, household appliances, machinery, art, antiquities etc) could 
reduce wealth concentration notably. Estimates in Jansson and Johansson (1988, ch. 7) indicate that they would  
decreases the top wealth percentile’s share in 1985 by a third. This is, however based on the assumption that 
durables not included in the tax material are relatively evenly distributed in the population, which we do not 
think is likely to be the case (see the further discussion below).   9




Our main series are based on market value-adjusted wealth data computed by Statistics Swe-
den for various years from 1975 onwards. Data for 1975 come from Spånt (1979). For the 
period 1978–2006 we use data based on micro-data evidence from the HINK/HEK database 
run by Statistics Sweden. This database consists of a representative sample of about 10,000-
20,000 households for which wealth tax returns and interview material are available, with a 
full sampling of the richest households.
21 Before 1999, wealth records are entirely based on 
tax returns with real and financial assets only roughly adjusted to market values. From 1999 
onwards, wealth information drawn from the Wealth Register (Förmögenhetsregistret), an 
individual-based database using personal tax assessment and control information from au-
thorities, banks and so forth (see further Statistics Sweden, 2005, 2006, 2007).  
 
Although the post-1975 data are arguably the most reliable in the entire period, they are not 
without problems. One is that the market values of condominiums are notoriously difficult to 
assess (see further Jansson and Johansson, 1988, pp. 68-73, 140-141). Another is that closely 
held companies are almost completely missing. Yet another problem is that the sample popu-
lation HINK/HEK is constructed for analyzing the distribution of income, not wealth. One 
consequence is that the oversampling of the richest household is made using an income-based 
proxy of wealth, realized capital gains, which may or may not be perfect in this respect.  
 
For the historical data before 1975, we use grouped distributions reported in the Censuses in 
1920, 1930, 1935, 1945, 1951 and finally some specific investigations from 1966 and 1970.
22 
Notable is that in all of these surveys, rich households are oversampled (based on taxable 
wealth) and their coverage for studying wealth concentration is hence likely to be good. 
                                                 
20 Spånt (1979, pp. 87-93) gives estimates for real asset values based on Census information and miscellaneous 
historical price statistics. In the case of financial asset values, Waldenström (forthcoming) shows that the de-
flated composite stock price index at the Stockholm Stock Exchange was a basically constant level between the 
first observation in 1906 and 1986 when prices took off. 
21 The sources are Jansson and Johansson (1988), Jansson and Johansson (2000) for the period 1978-1997 and 
specific tabulations by Statistics Sweden for the years 1999-2006.  
22 Sources are wealth tax tabulations in Statistics Sweden (1927, 1937, 1938, 1940, 1951, 1956), SOU (1969) 
and Spånt (1975).  10
2.2.3  Foreign household wealth data  
In 1989, Sweden removed its capital controls barring capital flows in and out of the country 
but kept its internationally high taxes on wealth and inheritance intact. This could easily lead 
to a situation where the rich move their capital overseas for tax avoidance reasons, and if so 
domestic wealth inequality could be severely underestimated. In this study, we therefore in-
troduce an approach to analyze this by combining the official domestic household wealth dis-
tribution data (presented above) with similarly standard estimates of foreign household wealth 
from the Balance of Payments (B.o.P) and the Financial Accounts (F.A.) (see Table A1 in 
Appendix A for details).
23 A third source of foreign household wealth is the super rich 
Swedes who have taken both their wealth and themselves out of the country, but since they do 




Our computations of foreign household wealth are based on the exact same data and method-
ologies as are used by the producers of the underlying data, the Swedish Riksbank and Statis-
tics Sweden. The basic approach rests on deriving residuals between observed balance sheet 
entries. In the case of the B.o.P., real sector savings (in the current and capital accounts) 
should equal net financial flows (in the financial account) each year.
25 This was also the case 
up until the late 1980s. At that point, the residual, called net errors and omissions, started 
growing negative year after year, signaling continuing unaccounted net capital outflows. 
About a third of these outflows are not actual outflows but rather accounting and valuation 
errors when compiling the current, capital or financial accounts. For this reason we use only 
65 percent of the observed net errors and omissions as our estimate of foreign household 
wealth.
26 In the case of the F.A., the residual is called unexplained financial savings and is 
                                                 
23 Jansson and Johansson (1988, pp. 163-165) come the closest in their discussion of how the emigration of 100 
rich families (assuming different sizes of their wealth) would affect domestic wealth inequality. Unlike them, we 
analyze the foreign wealth of households that have remained in Sweden (i.e., residents). Moreover, we actually 
do analyzes the emigrated Swedes as well in the robustness section, and then make use of the journalistic esti-
mates of the wealth of the about 30-50 named super rich Swedish households residing in foreign countries. In 
their study of wealth concentration in Switzerland, Dell et al. (2007) data on foreigner’s wealth in the 1990s as 
reported to Swiss authorities are analyzed. However, the wealth is not related to country of citizenship or sys-
tematically linked to inequality estimates in other countries. 
24 In the robustness section we analyze the wealth of super rich Swedes living abroad. Examples of rich Swedes 
living abroad are Ingvar Kamprad (owner of IKEA, living in Switzerland) and the Rausing family (owners of 
Tetra Pak, living in England and Denmark). 
25 Data on net errors and omissions for Sweden since 1975 come from the Swedish Riksbank. 
26 This particular figure has been reached through discussions with those who compile these data. Blomberg et 
al. (2003) are able to attribute about 14 percent of the net errors and omissions to known valuation errors in the  11
derived from comparing financial savings in the National Accounts (the difference between 
disposable income and the sum of private consumption and investment) and financial savings 




Next we need to decide who the Swedish residents holding overseas wealth are. This group 
should be fairly wealthy, both because the costs of establishing connections with foreign 
banks in tax havens are non-negligible (especially so a few years ago) and because wealth 
taxes have been fairly progressive. Throughout we attribute the estimates of foreign wealth to 
the households in the domestic top wealth percentile, which are 40–50,000 households (vary-
ing over time). This number has been reached after discussions with people at Statistics Swe-
den and the Swedish Riksbank who work with these numbers. If anything, the top percentile 
may be slightly too large concerning the 1980s and early 1990s (before the internet) whereas 
it may be slightly too small in the years thereafter.
28 Naturally, we also add the foreign wealth 
to the reference wealth total in the denominator. 
 
2.2.4  Journalistic wealth estimates for the super rich 
Tax authorities have great problems assessing the wealth of citizens who own large closely 
held companies. These wealthy households therefore often end up paying very low or no 
wealth taxes at all.
29 In the absence of objective information on these fortunes, journalists in 
several countries have created alternative wealth estimates of the wealth of the super rich 
based on subjective valuations. Examples of such listings are the Forbes 400 in the U.S. and 
the Sunday Times Rich List for the U.K. Because of their subjectivity in the valuation of the 
fortunes one must treat these numbers with great caution.
30 Yet when carefully treated these 
                                                                                                                                                          
export statistics. Above from that, the authors believe that there are other errors of at least those amounts. We 
decide to remove 35 percent of the observed sums for our estimated household share. 
27 Bergman and Rylander (1984), Persson (2002) and SOU 2002 (p. 298) all use the unexplained savings in the 
F.A. for analyzing the size of foreign household wealth. We use the newly revised figures for the financial sav-
ings in the National Accounts. 
28 There are clearly a number of objections that can be raised to these assumptions. Our main purpose is, how-
ever, not to come up with an alternative measure of wealth concentration but rather to get a sense of the order of 
magnitude by which foreign wealth could affect the distribution. 
29 In Sweden, some large family firm-owners (those who owned more than 25 percent of a company’s shares by 
the end of 1991) were even exempt from wealth taxation in the Wealth Tax Act of 1997 (1997:233). This rule is 
generally considered to have been specifically designed for the Persson family (main owners of H&M). 
30 For example, their methods comprise of a subjective and typically undisclosed selection of valuation tech-
niques and comparisons with similar companies for which financial information is more openly disclosed. Jour- 12
lists hold information not otherwise available and they have been used previously by re-
searchers interested in studying the wealth of the super rich (e.g., Kopczuk and Saez, 2004 
and Edlund and Kopczuk, 2008).  
 
We use data on the wealth of super rich Swedes reported in “rich lists” published by the 
Swedish business magazines Affärsvärlden, Månadens Affärer and Veckans Affärer for single 
years between 1983 and 2006.
31 Based on these listings, we retrieve information about two 
groups of super rich for our analysis: Swedish households living in Sweden with wealth in 
closely held companies (hence not included in the official statistics) and Swedish households 
living abroad. As Table A2 in Appendix A shows, the named residents owning non-listed 
wealth are between 100 and 300 in the 1980s and 1990s owning about half a billion SEK. In 
the 2000s, the lists only include between 40 and 60 of them with an average wealth between 
2-3 billion SEK. As for the foreigners, they have been between 10 and 50 in the listings with 
average fortunes between 3 and 17 billion SEK.  
2.2.5  Retirement wealth data 
Pension wealth and social security wealth are important sources of income for most people at 
their retirement. For this reason, researchers sometimes add estimates of retirement wealth to 
the net marketable wealth of households, yielding what is often called augmented wealth.
32 
Conceptually, it is not unproblematic to include retirement wealth in the personal wealth. On 
one hand, it is a fairly well-defined future benefit stream accruing to each individual in soci-
ety that highly influences the incentives of individuals to save for retirement. On the other 
hand, individuals cannot freely access their pension wealth (e.g., to realize it before retirement 
age), which violates one of the fundamental aspects of private property rights to personal as-
sets. For this reason, the distribution of augmented wealth should be treated separately from 
the conventional wealth inequality measurement.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
nalists collect most of their information from publicly available sources such as newspapers, company reports 
and financial market prices, but at times also interviews with the rich themselves are used. See further the dis-
cussions in Davies and Shorrocks (2000) and Atkinson (2008) 
31 In fact, earlier calculations of the richest Swedish families were done by Hermansson (1959, 1962) and by the 
public investigation SOU 1968:7. In all these cases, tax returns formed the basis of personal wealth which is 
reasonably comparable with today’s market-valued numbers as we argue elsewhere in this paper. 
32 This approach was first suggested by Feldstein (1976) and has then been applied by several others.  13
Our estimates of the distribution of augmented wealth come from different sources. Generally 
speaking, historical data on Swedish retirement wealth and its distribution are scarce. We use 
in this paper three point estimates that have been made with specific application to the distri-
bution of net personal wealth: Ståhlberg (1981) for 1978, Jansson and Johansson (1988) for 
1985 (largely building on Ståhlberg’s estimate), and our own (rough) estimate for 2004. The 
calculations are based on arriving at net present values of all individuals’ current and future 
claims on the different parts of the pension system. For details on the 1978 and 1985 esti-
mates, see Appendix B. 
3  Wealth concentration 1873–2006 
This section presents our main results. We begin by showing the long-run evolution of wealth 
concentration for groups in the top of the Swedish distribution over the entire period. Then we 
divide the 130 years into three subperiods based mainly on the observed patterns but also on 
instances of important structural changes in the Swedish society. For the first period, 1870–
1910 which roughly corresponds to the industrial take-off, we rely entirely on estate tax data. 
In the subsequent period, the 1910–1980 which covers the entire build-up and expansion of 
the Welfare State, we can compare results from estate data with wealth tax data. Finally, in 
the period after 1980 when internationalization increased and capital flows were liberalized 
we also make use of our estimates of foreign household wealth as well as journalistic sources. 
3.1  Long-run trends 
Figure 1 shows the development of the wealth share for the top decile over the period 1873–
2006. According to this measure wealth concentration was stable at a high level which lasted 
almost until 1945, with only a small drop in the 1930s (visible in the wealth tax data). Given 
that 1930s marks the start of the long era of Social Democratic rule under which the welfare 
state was created (with much of the early implementation interrupted by World War II) this 
seems to fit well with broad stylized facts.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
However, as has been pointed out several times in recent work on top incomes and wealth, 
when only looking at the evolution of top decile, one typically fails to see a number of impor-
tant aspects of the data. Figure 2 shows the development of the top percentile (P99–100), the  14
next nine per cent (P90–99) and the residual remaining population (P0–90), revealing a num-
ber of interesting facts. The development between the 1870s and the 1900s is now character-
ized by a slight increase for the top percentile at the expense of the rest of the population. 
From the 1910s and onward, until around 1980, the wealth share of the top percentile drops 
by a factor of three. Until around 1950, however, this leveling happens within the top decile, 
giving the impression – seen in Figure 1 above – that no big changes occur. In the period 
1910 to 1950 the wealth share of the P90–99 increases by a factor of 1.5 while the share of the 
top percentile is divided by about as much. The rise of “popular wealth”, mainly owner-
occupied housing held by the lower nine deciles (P0–90), seems to start around 1930 with the 
major increases coming after the Second World War, and after 1950 the increase for the P0–
90 group happens at the expense of the entire top decile. Around 1980 the leveling seems to 
come to a halt, and the wealth shares for the top groups have increased slightly in the recent 
past. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Our data also allow us to analyze the long-run patterns of wealth shares in the very top of the 
wealth distribution. Figure 3 displays the shares of groups within the top vintile: the lowest 
four percentiles (P95–99), the bottom nine tenths of the top percentile (P99–99.9), the top 0.1 
percentile (P99.9–100) and the top 0.01 percentile (P99.99–100).
33 It confirms the previous 
finding of the very rich losing ground throughout the twentieth century and gives more infor-
mation about the order of magnitude by which this compression took place. The top 0.1 per-
centile’s share plummeted from 28.1 percent in 1908 to only 5.1 in 1978. The fall of the top 
0.01 percentile was even more drastic, from 13.6 percent to 1.7 percent. This pattern becomes 
even the more striking when contrasted against P95–99 which increased its share until 1950, 
then experienced a relative fall until around 1980, and has then recovered only to land at a 
wealth share in 2000 which is almost exactly the same as in 1908.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
                                                 
33 The estimates for the richest groups may be associated with some uncertainty in the earlier periods as they 
consist of only some 300–500 households. Recall though that the shares for 1975 onwards draw on complete 
sampling of roughly the top 0.1 percentile.  15
Overall the Swedish development suggests a gradual process, with wealth slowly trickling 
down from the top as development progresses, possibly with a period of slightly increasing 
concentration in the first phase of industrialization, much in line with Kuznets’ basic idea. 
Even though our data does not allow us to identify precisely what has been driving this proc-
ess we can get a number of clues and also get a more precise picture by analyzing the data in 
some more detail. We do so by looking separately at three sub-periods: 1870–1910, 1910–
1980, and 1980–2006. 
3.2  1870–1910: Wealth concentration during the industrial take-off 
Sweden was a latecomer in the process of industrialization, with its industrial take-off being 
dated sometime in the second half of the nineteenth century.
34 Since our first observation of 
wealth concentration is 1873 our series capture the evolution of wealth concentration over the 
whole era of industrialization in Sweden.
35 This is particularly important since Kuznets’ in-
fluential hypothesis about industrialization is explicit about inequality increasing during the 
initial stages of economic development.  
 
Our data suggest that between the 1870s and the first decade of the 20th century, the top one 
percent increased their wealth share by approximately five percentage points from about 55 
percent to around 60. The losses for the rest of the population was relatively evenly spread 
with the share for the P90–99 and P0-90 groups dropping by about three and two percentage 
points respectively. While these movements are small they indicate a development consistent 
with the idea that industrialization initially created wealth which was concentrated in the top 
of the distribution.
36 However, it should also be noted that for this period we have to rely on 
estate data without being able to make any mortality multiplier adjustments. 
 
                                                 
34 For example, according to the growth-rate based definition in Maddison’s (1982) ‘Phases of capitalist devel-
opment’ Sweden achieved growth rates averaging above one percent for the first time in the 1850s and 1860s.  
35 There exists one isolated observation from a wealth survey in 1800 thanks to Soltow (1985). We have not been 
able to study the data underlying that estimate and we have therefore not incorporated it in this analysis. 
36 While we study very different aspects of inequality, our findings are compatible with Söderberg (1991) who 
finds an increasing inequality in salaries over the period 1850-1914. However, at this time it is not likely that the 
top percentile in the wealth distribution was affected much by increased salaries. Rather, a more likely interpre-
tation is that the reason for why the top percentile in the wealth distribution did not go up more, was that some of 
the gains from industrialization actually went to skilled workers.  16
3.3  1910–1980: Wealth equalization and the rise of “popular wealth” 
Between the 1910s and the years around 1980, Sweden experienced a substantial equalization 
of the personal wealth distribution. For example, the top percentile went from owning about 
60 percent of all wealth in 1908 to owning less than 20 percent in 1980. As Figure 3 reveals, 
however, between 1908 and 1950 it was only the households in the top 0.1 percentile that 
experienced a steady decrease whereas the wealth share of the next 0.9 percent (P99–99.9) 
remained constant until 1930 whereas the 4 next percentiles (P95–99) even increased their 
wealth shares. 
 
These heterogeneous patterns within the top indicate two things about the possible causes of 
wealth compression. First, the economic and financial shocks in the early 1920s (a banking 
and deflation crisis) and the early 1930s (the Kreuger-crash of 1932) had a negative effect on 
top fortunes. However, this effect seems to have been more limited in Sweden than the effects 
of the world wars and the Great Depression in other countries where a larger share of the 
wealth was affected (see Ohlsson et al., 2008). Second, a more important driver behind the 
changed distribution of wealth seems to have been the new wealth creation occurring among 
the relatively income rich who previously held less wealth. This can be seen by studying a 
unique feature in Swedish tax data between the years 1911 and 1948 when Sweden practiced 
a form of progressive income and wealth tax which operated through adding a fraction of tax-
able wealth (in principal equal to net wealth) to individual income to calculate what was 
called the “taxable amount”.
37 This information on the size of wealth holdings by income 
class is tabulated for a number of years and gives important information on changes in wealth 
concentration. Table 1 shows how the wealth share of top percentile in the income distribu-
tion decreased before 1950, in particular in the interwar period. By contrast, the “high-wage” 
income earners in the P90–95 income fractile increased their wealth share substantially over 
the same period, mainly in the 1910s and 1930s. The natural interpretation of these changes is 
that wealth as a source of income for the very rich declined in this period while, at the same 
time, moderately rich groups with high incomes accumulated new wealth. Historically, these 
patterns are in line with the descriptions in Glete (1994, ch. 2 and 3) about the emergence of 
new corporate owners during the expansive 1910s and the successes of corporate executives 
in the 1930s. 
 
                                                 
37 For details on the Swedish historical income tax, see Roine and Waldenström (2008).  17
An additional clue to how this came about can found from looking at the historical series of 
income distribution in Roine and Waldenström (2008). These show that the income share of  
P90-95 – the group that more than doubled their wealth share between 1911-1948 – in-
creaseed very little over this period. This suggests that the increase in their wealth share 
probably did not come from income equalization but rather from increased income mobility 





[Table 1 about here] 
 
After 1950 the trend of increased accumulation continues down the distribution. The equaliza-
tion of incomes certainly contributed to this development. Already in 1950 Sweden had estab-
lished its position as one of the most equal countries in the world in terms of incomes and this 
trend continued until around 1980.
39 Other sources of continued wealth equalization can be 
found in the composition of total wealth. Between 1950 and 1980 the share of owner occupied 
housing in total wealth increases from being 17 percent of all wealth to 45 percent in 1975.
40 
This was partly due to increasing values of existing housing (which in turn was partly based 
on increased infrastructure investment) but mainly due to new developments of owner occu-
pied housing for which the government provided generously subsidized loans.
41 At the same 
time the fraction of rental property as well as that of shares (listed and unlisted), both highly 
concentrated in the very top of the distribution, decreased from 17 to 4, and from 14 to 7 per-
cent respectively. The combined effect of these changes was an increase in the share held by 
the nine “poorest” deciles (P0-90) from just above 20 percent in 1950 to around 45 percent in 
1980, with a corresponding fall in the share held by the richest decile (P90–100). 
                                                 
38 Yet another possibility would be changes in policies that disproportionately benefited this group but at this 
time such an explanation seems unlikely. 
39 See Roine and Waldenström (forthcoming). 
40 This share has remained relatively constant since when adding owner occupied apartments, houses, and vaca-
tions homes (consumer durables also increased a lot but stay a relatively small share of the total), see Spånt 
(1979, pp 78-80) and Jansson and Johansson (2000, pp 19-21).  
41 See Englund (1993).  18
3.4  1980-2006: Globalization and higher concentration 
Around 1980 the long period of wealth compression came to a halt. A number of previous 
studies have analyzed Swedish wealth inequality in this period, finding the lowest inequality 
in the early 1980s and a moderate increase thereafter.
42 Much of the fluctuations in wealth 
shares in the period after 1980 have been found to depend on asset price movements, with 
increases in real estate values reducing inequality since many Swedes own their houses, while 
increases in share prices make the top shares larger as share ownership is concentrated. Still, 
the official estimates of top wealth shares do not seem to capture the dramatic increases in 
stock returns at the Stockholm Stock Exchange between 1980 and 2000, with an average an-
nual real rate of return of more than 20 percent.
43 
 
We believe that there are two main reasons for why some of the potentially most important 
changes in the Swedish wealth distribution are not captured in the tax statistics (or in sur-
veys). First, over the past decades there has been a substantial increase in wealth holdings 
outside of Sweden and second, there are large privately held family firms (not captured by the 
tax statistics) which have grown in value over this same period. We examine the potential 
impact of these non-disclosed fortunes on the official wealth inequality estimates of Statistics 
Sweden by adding estimated sums of foreign household wealth (from the net errors and omis-
sions in the Balance of Payments) and of domestic wealth of super rich residents (from the 
journalistic listings) to the observed domestic wealth of the top wealth percentile in the offi-
cial statistics. Table 2 shows these sums for years between 1978 and 2006 together with the 
corresponding official wealth amounts of the whole Swedish household population and its top 
percentile. The net errors and omissions were basically zero before 1989 after which they 
started to increase, landing at an accumulated outflow in 2006 of 432 billion SEK, or 66 bil-
lion USD in constant 2006 prices.
44 The unexplained financial savings in the F.A. also exhibit 
                                                 
42 According to the official estimates at Statistics Sweden (Jansson and Johansson, 2000, and Ohlsson et al., 
forthcoming), the wealth share of the top percentile increased about ten percent over the 25-year period between 
1978 (16.6 percent) and 2002 (18.4 percent). For other recent studies of the Swedish wealth inequality, see Spånt 
(1987); Jansson and Johansson (1988); Kashefi (1989); Bager-Sjögren and Klevmarken (1998) and Klevmarken 
(2004, 2006). 
43 The remarkable value growth at the Stockholm Stock Exchange is not dependent on choice of starting or end-
ing year. In fact, the real stock returns index (see Waldenström, forthcoming) at year-end were 75.4 in 1980, 
689.0 in 1990, 4826.3 in 2000 and 5817.5 in 2005, which results in average increases of between 20 and 25 
percent per year.  
44 The fact that the net errors and omissions are zero in 1978 does not imply that there was no Swedish private 
capital placed abroad for tax reasons. It only means that there were practically no “omitted” capital outflows in 
the balance of payments statistics during this period, since the Swedish Riksbank had indeed approved of some 
very large capital transfers by private individuals (see further Lindkvist, 1990).   19




[Table 2 here] 
 
Figure 4 displays the distributional effect from adding foreign and domestic closely held su-
per-rich wealth to the officially disclosed wealth of the richest percentile in the domestic 
wealth distribution. This adjustment causes a notable trend break in the share of the top per-
centile around 1980, with the share increasing from about 20 percent to almost 30 percent by 
in the early 2000s. Much of this increase occurs in connection with Sweden’s financial liber-
alization in 1989 and continues thereafter, in line with the amounts presented in Table 2. Note 
that these data do not contain any assumed accumulated interests on the foreign capital, why 
they should be interpreted as cautious estimates. Note also the increasing wedge between the 
new series and the basically flat trend in the official wealth tax-based series. 
 
The sizeable impact of foreign wealth on the wealth concentration is probably a phenomenon 
that is, if not unique, unusually important for Sweden (and possibly for the other Nordic coun-
tries). The combination of high taxation of wealth, large increases in especially financial 
wealth beginning in the early 1980s and the lowered cost of avoiding wealth taxes by moving 
wealth abroad would suffice to explain the observed patterns. When doing the same additions 
for the U.S., i.e., adding foreign wealth (in the net errors and omissions in the Balance of 
Payments) and the often closely held wealth of the super-rich (in the Forbes listings), there is 
no similar effect on the domestic wealth concentration.
46  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
                                                 
45 Another potential explanation is, of course, statistical errors in the calculations. See Rylander and Bergman 
(1989) for an analysis of how valuations of different assets could matter for the calculation of the aggregates. 
46 Adding these wealth items increases the 2004 share of the U.S. top wealth percentile increases its share from 
33.4 to 34.6, an increase of about 3 percent which is to be compared to the more 50 percent increase in the Swed-
ish case. The calculation is based on top wealth share in the Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell, 2006). 
Then we add 80 percent (assumed share of capital owned by households) of the accumulated net errors and 
omissions (“Statistical Discrepancy”) in the U.S. international transactions accounts data (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2007), with no rate of return on foreign wealth. Second we add the domestic wealth of the top 400 
individuals in the Forbes 400, and an additional 1.2 percent of their wealth which is the assumed amount held by 
rich Americans abroad (based on comparisons between the Forbes 400 and the Americans living aborad in the 
Forbes listings of the world’s richest people).  20
4  Robustness of our estimates and alternative measures of concentration 
4.1  Taxation values or market values, taxable wealth or “all” wealth 
As discussed above there are a number of potential problems with translating data to wealth 
shares. When using tax data, the main types of concern stem from differences between tax 
values and actual (market) values and differences in what items are included in the wealth 
taxation. Both of these aspects can (but do not necessarily) affect the wealth shares. While our 
main series after 1975 are wealth shares calculated based on market values (arguably what 
should be used), such data do not exist for the period before. There are, however, estimates of 
the market value of the total (taxed) wealth starting in 1935 as well as the effects of market 
valuation on the wealth shares in 1975.
47 There are also estimates of market values of “all” 
household wealth (including items which are not part of taxable wealth) for the period 1950–
1987.
48 Using these alternative reference totals and various assumptions about the distribution 
of the difference between our main reference total and these alternatives we can get a sense of 
how our main series could change.  
 
In table 3 we show the difference in reference totals and what we consider to be the lower 
bound for the top percentile share, P99–100 (the qualitative differences are the same for all 
top shares). The shares are based on the assumption that the amounts which are not included 
in the tax data (or the difference between tax and market values) are distributed according to 
the income distribution (we think that the true distribution is likely to be more uneven but this 
gives a lower bound to the estimates). We also include shares based on the assumption that 
the difference between tax values and market values are the same as in 1975. The resulting 
shares are lower than our main series, especially when looking at the alternative based on “all 
wealth” including what is not taxed.
49 This is hardly surprising given that the totals according 
to Berg (1988) are about twice our reference total and we assume that the difference is dis-
tributed according to income. However, as can be seen by the percentage changes between 
years, the trend is very similar over time. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                 
47 Spånt (1979) where historical figures from 1945 onwards are based on actual data while the values for 1935 
are calculated using the relations in 1945.  
48 Berg (1988) gives a detailed account of how these data have been constructed. 
49 The substantially lower shares when including “all wealth” (including consumer durables) are in line with 
what the findings in Jansson and Johansson (1988).  21
4.2  Comparing our series with findings in other studies of wealth concentration 
An important check of our findings is to contrast them with previous estimates of the Swedish 
wealth concentration based on slightly different methodologies or sources. Earlier attempts to 
estimate the distribution of household wealth have used either the same wealth tax sources as 
we do or completely different sources based on household surveys. Figure 6 shows three al-
ternative wealth tax-based estimates of the top wealth percentile (P99–100) and the next nine 
wealth percentiles in the top decile (P90–99): our main series, those of Spånt (1979) for 
1920–1975 and those of Kashefi (1989) of 1983–1985. The main trends and levels are basi-
cally the same in all three cases, which maybe is not so surprising given the fact that they all 
derive from the same wealth data source. Yet it is worth noting that the differences in interpo-
lation techniques, reference wealth and population totals do not seem to have an important 
impact on the estimates. 
 
[Figure 5 about here]  
4.3  Shares within shares 
Our top wealth shares may contain measurement error through the estimated reference total 
wealth held by the full population. An alternative way of studying wealth concentration with-
out having to rely on the reference wealth total of the whole population is to express the con-
centration in terms of the wealth share of certain top groups within the wealth share of an-
other, larger, top group. For example, by dividing the top wealth percentile by the top wealth 
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Figure 5 depicts the evolution of wealth concentration using shares within shares estimates 
and hence without any potentially bias from reference wealth totals. Overall, the patterns con-
firm some of our previous conclusions. The very top of the distribution experience a falling 
share relative to the group just below, especially in the first half of the century. However, the 
magnitudes are similar to those observed in our main series, i.e., when the top is related to the 
                                                 
50 Too see that this removes the influence of reference totals, note that P99-100 = WTop1/WAll (with W = Wealth) 
and P90-100 = WTop10/WAll. Hence, P99-100/P90-100 = (WTop1/WAll)/(WTop10/WAll) = WTop1/WTop10.  22
wealth of the whole population, implying that the group below the very top behaves similarly 
to the rest of the population. After around 1950 there is much less change in the concentration 
within the top group, while top wealth shares in our main series fall. This implies that in this 
period most of the change is driven not by the changes of the very top in relation to those just 
below, but by the change of the entire top decile in relation to the rest of the population.  
4.4  Altering the definitions of foreign wealth and super rich wealth 
Our main analysis showed that foreign household wealth and large domestic family-firm for-
tunes have a first-order effect on the Swedish wealth concentration after 1980. As was stated, 
however, the added series were only a subset of all available estimates and also based on re-
strictive assumptions regarding the return to foreign capital. In the present section we there-
fore present a number of alternative series using combinations of all available wealth sources 
(both B.o.P. and F.A. foreign household wealth series as well as journalistic estimates of for-
eign and domestic wealth of super rich Swedes) and different assumptions about the yield of 
foreign capital (zero and five percent nominal rate of return).  
 
Figure 7 depicts the evolution of the top wealth percentile since World War II when different 
alternative measures of foreign household and domestic family firm wealth are added to the 
market valued wealth tax data.
51 The results confirm the sizeable impact on Swedish wealth 
inequality since 1980, but the degree of impact across the series is quite varying. For example, 
while the top percentile’s share in the unadjusted domestic wealth series is 18.4 percent in 
2002, it is 23.9 after adding the (mainly) family-firm wealth of super rich residing in Sweden. 
Overall, these alternative measures suggest that the impact of foreign wealth and closely held 
firms is significant and also that the choice of how to view citizens of a country residing 
abroad can have a very large impact on measures of top wealth concentration.
52.  
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51 The domestic benchmark wealth, based on market-valued wealth tax-based data, is denoted “W”.  Our alterna-
tive series then come from adding combinations of different foreign and domestic wealth types to W of the top 
percentile (P99–100) and, of course, to the reference total. We use the following acronyms: BP (B.o.P.-based 
estimates of foreign household wealth), FA (F.A.-based estimates of foreign household wealth), BPI and FAI 
(the two previous but when a 5 percent rate of return is added), DSR (closely held wealth of super rich living in 
Sweden), and SR (sum of all listed wealth of super rich Swedes living in Sweden and abroad). There are discon-
tinuous jumps in some of the series, in 1978 for those containing F.A.-based foreign wealth (for which we have 
data from 1978) and in 1983 for those containing domestic super rich wealth for the same reason. 
52 This point is also made by Atkinson (2008).  23
4.5  The role of pension and social security wealth 
So far we have considered the distribution of net marketable wealth, i.e., market-valued real 
and financial assets less debts. However, as discussed in Section 2 researchers have some-
times added the net present value of all current and future claims on the pension and social 
security systems to the net worth, creating a distribution of augmented wealth. The effect of 
adding the retirement wealth to marketable wealth has typically resulted in a most consider-
able equalization of wealth (see, e.g., Feldstein, 1976; Feinstein, 1996; Wolff, 2005). For ex-
ample, the top percentile in the U.K. in 1991 owned 17 percent of marketable wealth but only 
10 percent of augmented wealth. 
 
Figure 8 depicts the top one percent wealth share in Sweden between 1978 and 2005 using 
three different concepts of wealth: net marketable wealth, augmented wealth and, to be able to 
compare the distributional impacts of retirement wealth and foreign wealth, the sum of aug-
mented and foreign wealth. Two findings stand out. First, adding retirement wealth generates, 
as expected, a much lower level of concentration. Second, the increasing trend in wealth con-
centration found when adding foreign wealth to the top percentile is not affected by also con-
sidering retirement wealth. The trend in augmented wealth concentration follows the largely 
flat trend in marketable wealth concentration, whereas adding foreign wealth to augmented 
wealth (the dotted line in the figure) shows that the increasing trend remains unaffected.
53  
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
5  International comparison 
How does the Swedish wealth concentration over the path of development match similar evi-
dence for other countries? In particular, was the distributional impact of industrialization as 
marginal elsewhere as it seems to have been in Sweden? And was the dramatic wealth com-
pression over the twentieth century a specific Swedish phenomenon based on the develop-
ment of the extensive welfare state? In this section we make an attempt to address these ques-
                                                 
53 In fact, the trend increase between 1985 and 2004 is larger when using augmented wealth than when using 
marketable wealth. A similar result that the equalizing role of retirement wealth has diminished over the past 
decades has been found for the U.S. in Wolff (2006). However, due to the great uncertainty in the Swedish esti-
mates we refrain from making such a conclusion and confine ourselves with the observation that the trend is 
basically flat in both the marketable wealth and augmented wealth cases.  24
tions by mapping the Swedish long-run experience on that of three other major Western coun-
tries: France, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
 
Figure 9 depicts the top wealth percentile in these four countries between 1740 and today. The 
extraordinarily long time period is motivated by the fact that the English industrialization be-
gan in the second half of the eighteenth century while it started some 50-100 years later in the 
U.S. and France and more than 100 years later in Sweden. Clearly, great caution should be 
taken when comparing these series as they are not based on the same wealth data sources and 
in all cases but France the outcome of splices between different compilations. Still we are not 
the first to combine these pieces of evidence and therefore believe that some conclusions can 
be drawn about the long-run developments we study here. 
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
Two broad results can be drawn from the series. First, we do not think that the evidence un-
ambiguously supports the idea that wealth inequality increases in the early stages of industri-
alization. Looking at the development of the wealth share of the top percentile among the 
countries analyzed here, the Swedish series exhibit a fairly stable inequality level over the 
initial stages of industrialization (in the late nineteenth century). The U.K. series (England and 
Wales) show increasing wealth shares for the top percentile in the period of the two industrial 
revolutions (1740–1911), as do the U.S. and French series over the nineteenth century. Over-
all this suggests that going from a rural to an industrial society, with entirely new stocks and 
types of wealth being created, may, but does not necessarily, give rise to a large increase in 
wealth concentration.  
 
Second, while the series do not indicate a clear common pattern over the nineteenth century 
when industrialization took place the development over the twentieth century seems more 
uniform. The top percentile wealth share decreased sharply in all countries studied and the 
order of magnitude seems to be a decrease by about a factor two on average (from around 40-
50 per cent in the beginning of the century to around 20–25 per cent today). It also seems that 
the lowest point in most countries was around 1980 and that the top percentile wealth share 
has increased in most countries after that. The exception is the U.S. household series which  25
first increases up to 1929, then falls sharply up to 1950 and then goes up and down up to the 
1980s when it stabilizes on an internationally high level.  
6  Concluding remarks 
This paper has presented new evidence on trends in wealth concentration in Sweden over the 
period 1873–2005. Spanning such a long period of time our series allow us to address ques-
tions regarding the dynamics of wealth distribution over the path of Sweden’s development 
from an agrarian to a modern economy. It also allows us to put the achievements and the role 
of the welfare state, as well as the recent increases in wealth concentration, in historical per-
spective.  
 
The picture that emerges is one of a development with many similarities to what has been 
found in previous studies for other countries, but also one with some important differences. 
Overall, our findings suggests that over the path of transition from being a poor agrarian 
economy to a rich industrialized one, wealth gradually spread to wider and wider groups. In 
terms of how Sweden differs from other countries, and in particular when it comes to the role 
of the welfare state in explaining this process, two aspects stand out. On the one hand, welfare 
state policies certainly played an important role in the latter stages of this development and 
the expansion of the welfare state after World War II coincides with much of the equalization 
when looking at the relation between wealth shares held by the top decile and the rest of the 
population. Even if we can not explicitly test their individual influence, data on income 
equalization, progressive taxation and policies such as subsidized loans to owner occupied 
housing suggest that these all disproportionately benefited the population below the top ten 
percent. On the other hand, the gradual Swedish wealth levelling started much before that. 
Already around 1910 we see evidence of the groups just below the very top increasing their 
wealth share and over time the increases move down the distribution. These changes can not 
be attributed mainly to exogenous shocks to top wealth holders – making the Swedish case 
different from France, the U.K. and the U.S. – but it is also hard to see what kind of policies 
enacted in the first half of the century that would cause this pattern. When looking at the 
wealth holdings of the P90-95 group in the income distribution, their share more than doubles 
between 1911-1948. However, during this period the income share of this group remains al-
most unchanged making it unlikely that the increased wealth share is a reflection of their in-
creased income share. Possible explanations that remain are increased savings in this group or  26
increased income mobility but unfortunately there is very little information on these aspects.
54 
What we can say is that, our results once again show the importance of studying develop-
ments for smaller subgroups within the top.
55 Looking only at the shares of the top decile and 
the rest indicates that wealth levelling started around 1950, but a finer decomposition of the 
shifts within the top decile show that the process of gradual wealth levelling started well be-
fore the expansion of the welfare state.  
 
After 1980 wealth concentration has increased, but only slightly according to standard official 
estimates. The commonly held view is that wealth concentration is still at a historically low 
level. At the same time there has been an ongoing debate about much of wealth leaving the 
country (mainly for tax reasons) and also of much wealth being concealed through closely 
held family firms not captured in tax statistics. Adding what we believe to be cautious esti-
mates of the accumulated wealth that has left the country over the past 25 years as well as 
estimating the impact of the wealth in large family firms we have shown that Swedish wealth 
concentration has probably increased by more than what is revealed in the official estimates. 
We also think that these effects are more important in Sweden than in many other countries. 
Beside attempting to estimate the magnitudes of these well-known, but typically neglected 
aspects, these figures also raise some increasingly important questions about how to treat for-
eign wealth (and income) when thinking about questions of economic inequality. Should we 
consider the distribution of all wealth in a country or of those who live in a country (including 
their wealth abroad) or should we consider the wealth of all citizens of a country regardless of 
where they live or have placed their wealth? Regardless of what position one takes on issues 
such as these, our estimates of recent changes in Sweden suggest that the answer matters a lot 
for the picture one gets of the wealth distribution. 
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Appendix A: Wealth concentration in Sweden, 1873-2006, main series. 
 
Table A1: Top marketable wealth shares, wealth and estate tax data, 1873-2006 
  Net worth (net marketable wealth) 
  Wealth tax data, market values  Estate tax data, tax values 
Year P90-100  P95-100  P99-100  P99.9-100 P99.99-100 P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99.9-100 P99.99-100
1873            88.34 81.19 60.46  35.60  5.75 
1874            85.82 77.35 52.82  24.23  4.41 
1875            85.83 77.49 54.18  24.46  6.79 
1876            86.14 77.66 55.69  23.15  7.40 
1877            85.99 77.39 54.07  23.55  5.60 
1906            87.38 78.37 57.75  26.14  4.36 
1907            88.32 79.88 61.29  31.70  11.19 
1908* 86.04  76.17  53.79 28.13  13.64  88.15 79.44 61.10  27.01  3.57 
1920  91.69  79.25  51.51  25.37  9.60         
1930  89.49  77.35  50.02  22.35  9.23         
1935  83.55  70.74  42.77  18.73  7.28         
1937     42.74  19.13  6.97         
1945 83.17  65.94  37.69 15.13  5.44  90.93 76.87 44.14  17.70  6.85 
1946  81.38  65.77  37.66  14.84  5.32         
1947  79.58  63.45  34.71  13.11  4.51         
1948  80.71  63.11  34.07  12.50  4.36         
1949  79.13  61.82  33.17  12.13  4.27         
1950  77.29  60.62  32.81  12.12  4.22         
1951  74.96  58.98  32.15  12.05  4.37         
1954            74.55 56.63 27.83  9.65  2.41 
1966  63.23  46.92  23.41  9.00  3.53         
1967            56.16 42.67 21.95  8.17  2.59 
1970  57.90  42.07  20.06  7.45  2.94         
1975  54.00  38.00  17.00  6.00  2.20         
1978  54.50  38.60  16.60  5.10  1.70         
1983  54.50  38.40  17.70  6.70  2.80         
1985  53.40  37.00  16.50  6.50  2.40         
1988  56.60  40.10  18.40  7.30  3.00         
1990  58.70  42.60  20.70  8.60  3.10         
1992  57.70  40.90  19.50  7.90  2.90         
1997  61.10  44.10  20.30  7.30  2.80         
1999  60.34  44.02  19.29  5.45  1.29         
2000  59.93  44.36  21.89  9.26  3.94         
2001  57.69  42.09  19.74  6.41  1.58         
2002 57.27  41.16  17.97 5.29  1.30  51.38 36.55 17.02  6.70  2.64 
2003 56.60  40.73  17.93 6.13  2.60  50.33 34.57 14.50  5.35  2.78 
2004  57.81  42.69  20.48  7.77  3.06         
2005  58.37  43.58  19.71  7.26  3.67         
2006  55.86  39.98  18.53  7.21  3.19         
Notes and sources: The shares based on estate tax data are for the population of the diseased. In 1908, however, 
there are mortality adjusted shares (marked with an *) and placed in the wealth tax data columns since they show 
the distribution for the living population.   32
Table A2: Top percentile share of marketable wealth after adding foreign, super-rich 
and retirement wealth, 1975–2006. 
 
 Marketable  wealth  Augmented  wealth 
  W  WBP WBPI WFA WFAI  WBPIDSR WFAIDSR WFAISR AW  AWBPIDSR
1975  17.00 17.94 17.94 17.00 17.00  17.94  17.00  17.00     
1978  16.60 17.08 17.17 20.52 20.52  17.17  20.52  20.52  7.82  8.09 
1983  17.70 17.59 17.72 23.03 23.97  20.11  26.01  28.36     
1985  16.50 16.87 17.00 22.60 23.81  20.36  26.65  30.25  6.68  8.27 
1988  18.40 19.20 19.34 25.45 26.96  22.52  29.58  33.11     
1990  20.70 22.96 23.18 26.21 28.02  26.28  30.74  33.74     
1992  19.50 21.64 22.11 27.36 29.90  25.20  32.42  35.04     
1997  20.30 24.87 25.75 26.96 31.10  27.37  32.49  36.59     
1999  19.29 23.79 24.95 23.81 28.13  25.72  28.83  36.54     
2000  21.89 26.93 28.22 26.33 30.70  30.45  32.78  42.10     
2001  19.74 25.55 27.14 24.73 29.53  29.45  31.69  41.63     
2002  17.97 25.12 27.07 23.83 29.20  29.48  31.47  41.54     
2003  17.93 24.89 27.05 23.61 29.01  29.14  30.99  40.08     
2004  20.48 26.52 28.81 26.42 31.52  30.83  33.39  43.15  13.75  20.69 
2005  19.71 25.01 27.37 25.42 30.34  29.47  32.27  41.26     
2006  18.53 22.36 24.68 23.97 28.47  26.89  30.46  39.61     
Note: W (Marketable net worth) = Domestic market valued wealth tax-based wealth; WBP = W + Foreign 
wealth of B.o.P.; WFA = W + Foreign wealth of F.A.; WBPI = WBP + 5% annual interest; WFAI = WFA + 5% 
annual interest; WBPDSR = WBP + Domestic super wealth; WBPISR = WBPI + Foreign and Domestic super 
wealth; WFAISR = WFAI + Foreign and Domestic super wealth; AW (Augmented wealth) = W + pension and 
social security wealth; AWBPIDSR = AW + WBPIDSR – W.   
Sources: See the text. 
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Appendix B: Estimates of foreign and domestic closely held wealth 
Table B1: Foreign household wealth estimates, 1975-2006 (Billion SEK, 2006 prices) 
  Net errors and omissions  
(Balance of Payments, B.o.P) 
  Unexplained financial savings  
(Financial Accounts, F.A.) 
Year  Annual 
flow  Accumulated  Accumulated 
(+ 5% interest)    Annual 
flow  Accumulated  Accumulated 
(+ 5% interest) 
1975 -2  19  19         
1976 1  16  17         
1977 4  10  12         
1978 -1  10  12      87  87 
1979 0  9  12    -13  95  99 
1980 4  4  7    -12  95  103 
1981 1  3  6    -20  105  117 
1982 5  -2  0    -9  106  122 
1983 0  -2  0    -10  107  128 
1984 -6  5  7    31  68  93 
1985 -3  7  10    -63  126  153 
1986 -7  14  16    -59  179  213 
1987 0  13  17    -32  204  247 
1988 -10  23  27    -24  217  269 
1989 -32  53  58    26  178  239 
1990 -24  72  80    -23  184  250 
1991 25  41  52    1  167  240 
1992 -15  56  68    -57  221  303 
1993 16  38  53    -68  279  372 
1994 -28  65  82    -20  292  402 
1995 -18  81  102    -6  291  417 
1996 -14  94  120    39  251  397 
1997 -60  153  185    20  230  395 
1998 -36  190  231    6  224  409 
1999 -1  190  243   32  191  396 
2000 -41  229  293    -12  201  423 
2001 -32  256  332    -21  217  455 
2002 -48  299  390    -28  241  496 
2003 -18  311  420    -14  250  524 
2004 4  306  435   -51  300  600 
2005 0  304  455   -31  330  658 
2006 39  261  432    -53  378  735 
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Table B2: Wealth of super rich Swedes in Sweden and abroad, 1983-2006. 
 
  Domestic closely held wealth  Foreign wealth  Listed fortunes:   
 Sum  Households  Average  Sum  Households Average  Lowest  Largest  Source
 BSEK  N  BSEK  BSEK  N  BSEK  BSEK  BSEK  
1983 46  99  0.47  26  10  3  0.21  15  Afv 
1988 95  174  0.55  85  32  3  0.14  40  Afv 
1991 110  299  0.37  74  42  2  0.13  38  Afv 
1992 87  261  0.34  65  38  2  0.12  32  VA 
1994 56  147  0.38  123  29  4  0.17  69  MA 
1996 107  144  0.74  104  21  5  0.39  44  MA 
1997 60  65  0.93  145  21  7  0.44  50  MA 
1999  36 20  1.79  343  20 17  1.1  138  VA 
2000 117  41  2.84  483  34  14  1.09  273  VA 
2001 118  38  3.11  536  34  16  1.06  319  VA 
2002 120  47  2.56  541  39  14  1.04  313  VA 
2003 111  43  2.59  515  38  14  0.61  307  VA 
2004 122  41  2.96  656  38  17  0.81  407  VA 
2005 141  45  3.14  651  38  17  1.01  385  VA 
2006 173  56  3.08  797  49  16  1  461  VA 
Notes and sources: In the years not displayed there were no wealth listings made. The wealth concept is net 
worth in all years except 1983 and 1988 when it is gross wealth. BSEK = Billion SEK (2006 prices), Afv = Af-
färsvärlden, VA = Veckans Affärer and MA = Månadens Affärer.  
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Appendix C: Calculating the Swedish augmented wealth concentration, 1978-2004 
 
There are many conceptual and practical problems associated with measuring retirement 
wealth and its distribution. First, parts of it are defined in collective form and hence not well-
defined for all individuals (or households) in the system. Second, the calculation of today’s 
claims on future pensions concerns a number of complex assumptions of people’s life expec-
tancy, future rates of return on the capital markets and so forth. Third, there are public and 
private parts of the pension system, funded and un-funded parts, and some of these are more 
easily observed and measured than others, which may create systematic measurement errors 
in the data. Fourth, the distributional features of the different parts of the pension system dif-
fer considerably and are also complicated to measure, e.g., in the case of mapping the pen-
sions across the income distribution onto households in the contemporaneous wealth distribu-
tion. 
 
Our estimates of the augmented wealth distribution are based on the estimate by Ståhlberg 
(1981) for 1978, Jansson and Johansson (1988) for 1985 (largely building on Ståhlberg’s es-
timate), and a rough estimate by ourselves for 2004. For details on the historical estimates see 
the respective sources. The estimated Swedish augmented wealth concentration in 2004 was 
computed in the following four steps. First, we take the estimated public pension wealth (pen-
sionsskuld) of all Swedes in the old-age pension system as calculated by the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency (Swedish Social Insurance Agency, 2006, pp. 21-23, 74). This amount in-
cludes the sum of current and estimated future pensions in the basic and supplementary (ATP) 
pensions as well as the sum of the funded part (PPM), in total 6,244 billion SEK (2004 cur-
rent prices). From this we subtract a latent tax debt of 30 percent since pensions are treated as 
taxable income, resulting in a net-of-tax public pension wealth of 4,271 billion SEK.  
 
Second, we take the sum of all funds in the private pension-related complementary benefits 
system (ITP). This amounts to almost 887 billion SEK as reported by Sjögren Lindquist and 
Wadensjö (2007). Specifically, these include funds without individual options of 478 billion 
SEK in the AFA and Alecta funds (table 6.2, p. 170) and all funds with individual options 
summing to about 408 billion SEK (table 6.5, pp. 177ff). In total, the public and private 
Swedish pension wealth net-of-tax amounts to 4,991 billion SEK.  
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Third, we calculate the shares that accrue to the top percentile for all of these different 
amounts. To do this, we use tabulated data on the Swedish labor income distribution in 2004 
from Roine and Waldenström (2007). In the public system (basic, ATP and PPM) all income 
earners receive about a fifth (18.5% for all and an additional 4.5% for the top nine deciles) of 
their earned income up to 317,250 SEK (7.5 basic income amounts, inkomstbasbelopp) as 
public pension. In the private system (ITP), income earners get 30 percent of their incomes 
above 294,750 SEK in pension. Since 317,250 SEK in 2004 represented the income of the 
75th percentile in the income distribution, this means that only the highest quartile received 
pensions in the ITP system. By combining all this distributional data for both public and pri-
vate systems, we land at the following retirement wealth shares in 2004. In the case of public 
(public + private = total) pension wealth, the share was for P0-75 51.6% (31.7%), for P75-90 
22.7% (15.2%), for P90-99 20.3% (17.4%) and for P99-100 5.4% (5.8%). In other words, the 
total retirement wealth was slightly more unequally distributed than the public retirement 
wealth only.  
 
Fourth, and finally, we compute the augmented wealth distribution by adding these amounts 
of retirement wealth for the fractiles in the income distribution to the net marketable wealth of 
the respective fractiles in the wealth distribution, hence assuming that they are approximately 
the same.  37
Table 1: Shares of wealth owned by top income earners 
 
P90-95 P95–99  P99–100  Income 
fractile:  Mainly high-wage earners  High-wage earners and rentiers  Mainly rentiers 
  Wealth share  Pct. change  Wealth share  Pct. change  Wealth share  Pct. change 
1911 3.5    10.8    33.8   
1920  6.7 90.7  16.6 53.9 41.9  23.8 
1930  6.4 –4.6  15.3 –8.2 38.0  –9.3 
1941  13.2  104.6  18.2 19.3 26.5  –30.3 
Note: We denote the P90-95 in the income distribution “high-wage earners” since their wealth on average in 
1911 was not large enough to live off. According the data used in Roine and Waldenström (2007), it would gen-
erate an annual capital income (assumed as five percent nominal return of the observed wealth) of roughly SEK 
200, or about a third of the average income in the country as a whole (which was about SEK 700). By contrast, 
the wealth of income earners in the top percentile, the rentiers as we call them, would on average generate about 
SEK 6,500, or more than nine times the average income. 
 
 
Table 2: Sums of foreign and super-rich wealth after 1978 (billion SEK, 2006 prices). 
 
  Domestic wealth  Foreign and family firm wealth 








rich Swedes living 
abroad 
1978 1,766  293  12  87  –  – 
1983 1,549  274  0  128  46  27 
1990 2,464  510  80  250  107  78 
1997 2,521  512  185  395  60  147 
2006 5,288  980  432  735  173  797 
Notes: All sums are in current SEK billion. For sources and details, see the text. We add a five percent annual 
rate of return on the accumulated foreign wealth as estimated from the Balance of Payments (B.o.P.) and the 
Financial Accounts (F.A.). The 1990 sums of super-rich wealth are from 1991 because no estimates were made 
for 1990. Most likely, the 1991 numbers are smaller than the 1990 ones due to the Swedish financial crisis which 
erupted in 1991. Note that of the 797 billion SEK owned by super-rich Swedes living abroad in 2006 as much as 
461 billion SEK, about 65 billion USD, adhere to IKEA founder Ingvar Kamprad.  
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Table 3: Alternative reference wealth totals, 1930–1985. 
 
a) Levels 
  Alternative wealth totals (million SEK)  Alternative shares for P99–100 
Year Tax  values  Market values  
(Spånt 1979) 
"All wealth" 










1930  15,304  20,404      50.02 42.52 40.96     
1935  17,600  23,460    42.77 36.35 35.16     
1945  25,290  33,500    37.69 32.03 30.85     
1951  32,950  53,300  77,141  32.15 27.33 22.71 17.99 
1966  103,180  144,300  232,611  23.41 19.90 18.57 13.95 
1970  147,760  190,200  358,106  20.06 17.05 16.98 11.95 
1975  358,700  508,000  622,939  17.00 14.45 13.59 12.08 
1985  864,213     1,599,307  16.50        11.03 
 
a) Changes 
  Percentage change of P99–100 (%) 
Years Main  series  Market-tax distributed 




uted as income 
1930-35 –14.5  –14.5  –14.1     
1935-45 –11.9  –11.9  –12.3     
1945-51 –14.7  –14.7  –26.4     
1951-66  –27.2 –27.2 –18.2 –22.4 
1966-70 –14.3  –14.3  –8.6  –14.4 
1970-75  –27.4 –27.4 –26.8 –13.4 
1975-85  –2.9        –8.8 
 
 


































P90-100 (wealth tax) P90-100 (estate data)
 
Source: Table A1. 
 
 
Figure 2: Wealth shares of top percentile, rest of top decile and bottom nine deciles us-



































P0-90 (wealth tax) P90-99 (wealth tax) P99-100 (wealth tax)
P0-90 (estate data) P90-99 (estate data) P99-100 (estate data)  
Source: Table A1.  40































P95-99 P99-99.9 P99.9-100 P99.99-100
 
Source: Table A1. 
 



































P0-90 (dom.) P99-100 (dom.) P0-90 (dom.+f.f.+for.) P99-100 (dom.+f.f.+for.)
 
Note: The notation “dom.” means wealth shares when using the market-valued wealth tax-based domestic 
wealth, “f.f.” the mainly closely held family firm wealth owned by super rich residents, and “for.” means the 
addition of foreign household wealth estimated from the B.o.P. (see text for further details). 
Sources: Tables A1 and A2.   41

































P99-100 (Our preferred) P99-100 (Spånt, 1979) P99-100 (Kashefi, 1989)
P90-99 (Our preferred) P90-99 (Spånt, 1979) P90-99 (Kashefi, 1989)  
Note: All series are based on wealth tax statistics. “Our preferred” is the main series presented in Figure 2. 
 
 
































P99-100/P90-100 (W) P99.9-100/P99-100 (W) P99.99-100/P99-100 (W)
P99-100/P90-100 (E) P99.9-100/P99-100 (E) P99.99-100/P99-100 (E)  
Note: The notation “W” and “E” refers to wealth tax and estate tax data sources, respectively. 
Sources: Calculations based on shares in Table A1.  42



























W WBP WBPI WFA WFAI
WBPIDSR WFAIDSR WBPISR WFAISR  
Note:  The acronyms in the figure are defined as follows: W (Marketable net worth) = Domestic net worth 
(wealth tax-based), WBP = W + Foreign wealth in B.o.P.; WFA = W + Foreign wealth in F.A.; WBPI = WBP + 
5% annual interest on foreign wealth; WFAI = WFA + 5% annual interest on foreign wealth; WBPDSR = WBP 
+ Domestic closely held super-rich wealth; WBPISR = WBPI + Foreign and Domestic closely held super-rich 
wealth; WFAISR = WFAI + Foreign and Domestic closely held super-rich wealth. See text for details. 
Sources: Table 2.  43


































Marketable net worth Augmented wealth Augmented + Foreign wealth
 
Sources: Table A2. 
 


































France* (estates) Sweden (households) Sweden (adults)
U.K.* (estates) USA (households) USA (adults)  
Notes and sources: The estate series for the U.S. (adults and households before 1960) and the U.K. (U.K.* de-
noting England/Wales up to 1939 and U.K. thereafter) are mortality-adjusted while the Swedish and French ones 
are not. For U.S. (households) after 1960 survey data were used. For details, see Ohlsson et al. (2008) and Table 
1 (this paper). 